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Psychopathic behavior is characteristically amoral, but to date research studies have largely failed to identify any systematic
differences in moral judgment capability between psychopaths and non-psychopaths. In this study, we investigate whether
significant differences in moral judgment emerge when taking into account the phenotypic heterogeneity of the disorder through
a well-validated distinction between psychopathic subtypes. Three groups of incarcerated participants [low-anxious psychopaths
(n¼12), high-anxious psychopaths (n ¼ 12) and non-psychopaths (n¼24)] completed a moral judgment test involving hypothet-
ical dilemmas. The moral dilemmas featured !personal" (i.e. involving direct physical harm) or !impersonal" (i.e. involving indirect
or remote harm) actions. Compared to non-psychopaths, both groups of psychopaths were significantly more likely to endorse the
impersonal actions. However, only the low-anxious psychopaths were significantly more likely to endorse the personal harms
when commission of the harm would maximize aggregate welfare#the !utilitarian" choice. High-anxious psychopaths and
non-psychopaths did not significantly differ in their personal moral judgments. These results provide novel laboratory evidence
of abnormal moral judgment in psychopaths, as well as additional support for the importance of considering psychopathic
subtypes.
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INTRODUCTION
Psychopaths are notorious for their amoral behavior. The
question of whether or not psychopaths know right from
wrong (in other words, whether or not they possess the cap-
acity for normal moral judgment) has long intrigued psych-
opathy researchers. For example, in his seminal clinical
descriptions of the disorder, Cleckley questions whether psy-
chopaths are in fact ‘moral imbeciles’ (Cleckley, 1941).
Despite the long-standing interest in this topic, there is lim-
ited experimental data on the psychopath’s ability to formu-
late normal moral judgments. The initial research in this area
focused exclusively on assessing psychopaths’ developmental
level of moral reasoning as per Kohlberg’s influential
six-stage model, which postulated a progression from
lower egocentric levels to higher levels reflecting proper so-
cialization and an appreciation of universal ethical principles
(Kohlberg, 1969). Results from these studies were mixed,
with some indicating lower levels of moral reasoning
among psychopaths relative to non-psychopaths (Fodor,
1973; Jurkovic and Prentice, 1977), some indicating higher
levels (Link et al., 1977) and some indicating no significant
difference (Lee and Prentice, 1988; Trevathan and Walker,
1989).
A subsequent study examined the ability of psychopaths to
distinguish ‘moral’ transgressions from ‘conventional’
transgressions (Blair, 1995). In this study, ‘moral’ transgres-
sions were defined as acts that violate the welfare of others
(e.g. a child hitting another child), whereas ‘conventional’
transgressions were defined as acts that violate rules or social
convention but do not directly affect the welfare of others
(e.g. a male child wearing a skirt). Non-psychopaths rated
the moral transgressions as significantly less permissible,
significantly more serious and significantly less dependent
on authority than the conventional transgressions.
Psychopaths, on the other hand, failed to distinguish be-
tween moral and conventional transgressions on any of
these ratings. However, this effect was driven by the psycho-
paths’ abnormally severe judgments of the conventional
transgressions; psychopaths rated the moral transgressions
normally.
In more recent years, a moral decision-making test that
distinguishes between ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ harms
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004) has been used to explore the
psychological and neurobiological processes underlying
moral judgment. In this test, the subject decides whether or
not it is hypothetically appropriate to commit some type of
harm or violation in order to achieve a particular favorable
outcome. The ‘personal’ harms involve direct, intimate,
physical contact (e.g. pushing one person off a bridge to
stop a runaway train car from hitting five people), whereas
‘impersonal’ harms involve more indirect or remote actions
(e.g. pulling a switch to divert a runaway train car from
hitting five people) or rule violations (i.e. lying on income
taxes to save money). A subset of the personal scenarios
feature the choice of whether or not to commit a direct phys-
ical harm to a single individual in order to preserve the
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welfare of a larger number of individuals. For these ‘high-
conflict’ scenarios, the choice to sacrifice one for the greater
welfare of others is considered a ‘utilitarian’ response, re-
flecting greater concern for the mathematically rational
ends than the emotionally aversive means (Greene et al.,
2004, 2008; Koenigs et al., 2007). Dilemmas of this nature
have been used to demonstrate abnormally utilitarian moral
judgment in clinical populations with known deficits in
social/emotional processing, such as patients with lesions
involving ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
(Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al.,
2010) and patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD)
(Mendez et al., 2005). The utilitarian response pattern in
these clinical populations thus appears to reflect the reduced
influence of affective processes that serve to qualify the more
‘rational’ aspect of moral decision-making (Greene, 2007;
Koenigs et al., 2007). Given the striking social/emotional
deficits observed in psychopaths, one might expect to find
similarly utilitarian patterns of moral judgment. However, a
recent study testing this hypothesis found no differences in
utilitarian moral judgment between psychopaths and
non-psychopaths (Cima et al., 2010).
One possible explanation for the ostensibly normal levels
of utilitarian moral judgment among psychopaths is the het-
erogeneity of the disorder. For decades, psychopathy re-
searchers have distinguished psychopaths with low levels of
trait anxiety from those with high levels of trait anxiety
(Lykken, 1957; Schmauk, 1970; Blackburn, 1975; Cleckley,
1976; Fagan and Lira, 1980; Newman et al., 1990; Newman
et al., 1992; Arnett et al., 1993, 1997; Brinkley et al., 2004;
Hiatt et al., 2004). This distinction is based on the theoretical
perspective that in some cases psychopathy may reflect an
innate affective and inhibitory deficit (the low-anxious or
‘primary’ subtype), whereas in other cases psychopathy may
arise as an indirect consequence of other temperament-
related traits!most commonly involving excessive emotion-
ality or neurotic anxiety (the high-anxious or ‘secondary’
subtype) (Karpman, 1946, 1948; Cleckley, 1976; Lykken,
1995; Porter, 1996; Skeem et al., 2007; Blackburn et al.,
2008). In a recent study using economic decision-making
tests, we found that low-anxious psychopaths differed in
their degree of ‘rational’ decision-making compared to
non-psychopaths and high-anxious psychopaths (Koenigs
et al., 2010). Moreover, consistent with the theoretical dis-
tinction between primary and secondary psychopathy, the
low-anxious (but not high-anxious) psychopathic group’s
performance was remarkably similar to that of neurological
patients with affective deficits due to vmPFC brain lesions.
In the present study, we seek to determine whether the
low- and high-anxious subtypes of psychopath differ in their
moral judgment. Using the personal/impersonal moral judg-
ment task described above (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), we test
the hypothesis that low-anxious psychopaths, but not high-
anxious psychopaths, will exhibit abnormally utilitarian
personal moral judgment.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were male inmates recruited from a medium
security Wisconsin correctional institution. Inmates were eli-
gible if they met the following criteria: under 45 years of age,
IQ greater than 70, no history of psychosis or bipolar dis-
order, and not currently taking psychotropic medications.
A total of 64 inmates met the inclusion criteria and part-
icipated in all study procedures. Informed consent was
obtained both orally and in writing.
The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (Hare, 2003)
was used to assess psychopathy. The PCL-R assessment in-
volves a 60–90min interview and file review to obtain infor-
mation used to rate 20 psychopathy-related items as 0, 1 or
2, depending on the degree to which each trait characterizes
the individual. A substantial literature supports the reliability
and validity of PCL-R assessments with incarcerated offend-
ers (Hare, 2003). To evaluate interrater reliability, a second
rater who was present during interviews provided independ-
ent PCL-R ratings for eight inmates. The intraclass correl-
ation coefficient was 0.85. PCL-R factors 1 and 2 scores were
computed following procedures outlined in the PCL-R
manual (Hare, 2003).
Participant groups
Participants were classified as psychopathic, if their PCL-R
scores were 30 or greater (n ¼ 24) and non-psychopathic if
their PCL-R scores were 20 or less (n¼ 24) (Hare, 2003).
Participants with intermediate PCL-R scores of 21–29
(n¼ 16) were not assigned to either group, and are omitted
from the main analyses below. Following the convention of
previous studies identifying psychopathic subtypes (Arnett
et al., 1997; Newman et al., 1997; Schmitt et al., 1999;
Lorenz and Newman, 2002; Brinkley et al., 2004; Hiatt
et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2010), psychopaths were subdi-
vided based on a median split of Welsh Anxiety Scale (WAS)
scores (Welsh, 1956). Thus, in our sample low-anxious
psychopathy was defined as having a PCL-R score of 30 or
greater and a WAS score of 13 or less (n¼ 12), while high-
anxious psychopathy was defined as having a PCL-R score of
30 or greater and a WAS score of 14 or greater (n¼ 12). The
three participant groups (low-anxious psychopaths, high-
anxious psychopaths and non-psychopaths; Table 1) did
not significantly differ with respect to age or estimated IQ.
Low-anxious psychopaths and high-anxious psychopaths did
not significantly differ in terms of PCL-R total score, PCL-R
Factor 1 score or PCL-R Factor 2 score.
Testing procedure
Participants made judgments on a series of 24 hypothetical
moral scenarios, which were selected from a previously pub-
lished set (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007). In
some cases, the original scenario language was modified so as
to be more easily understood by inmates with limited read-
ing skills. Each scenario was presented on a single sheet of
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paper, followed by a question about a hypothetical action
related to the scenario (‘Would you . . . in order to . . .?’).
This question format follows previous clinical and prison
studies (Koenigs et al., 2007; Cima et al., 2010).
Participants circled ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to indicate their responses.
‘Yes’ responses always indicated commission of the proposed
action. There was no time limit for reading the scenario
description or responding to the question. Following previ-
ous studies using this test (Greene et al., 2001, 2004;
Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al.,
2010), we used two classes of moral scenarios. ‘Personal’
moral scenarios (n¼ 14) involved committing direct, intim-
ate physical harm to another (i.e. pushing one person off a
bridge to stop a runaway train car from hitting five people),
whereas ‘impersonal’ moral scenarios (n¼ 10) involved
more indirect or remote harm (i.e. pulling a switch to
divert a runaway boxcar from hitting five people) or rule
violations (i.e. lying on income taxes). The personal actions
have been rated as significantly more emotionally aversive
than the impersonal actions (Koenigs et al., 2007).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Our hypothesis pertains to specific between-group differ-
ences in moral judgment (i.e. low-anxious psychopaths will
differ from non-psychopaths in personal moral judgment,
whereas high-anxious psychopaths will not differ from
non-psychopaths). To compare moral judgment between
groups for a particular class of scenarios, we (i) computed the
proportion of ‘yes’ responses for that class of scenario for
each individual, (ii) computed the mean proportion of ‘yes’
responses across all individuals in each group and (iii) com-
pared groups in pairwise fashion with planned t-tests, with
the key test of interest being low-anxious psychopaths vs
non-psychopaths for personal moral scenarios.
RESULTS
We first report the moral judgment data from the non-
psychopaths and the entire group of psychopaths (Figure 1).
Across all 24 moral scenarios, the psychopaths endorsed a
significantly greater proportion of the proposed actions
(M¼ 0.63, s.d.¼ 0.18) than did the non-psychopaths
(M¼ 0.51, s.d.¼ 0.12) (t¼ 2.6, P¼ 0.01). This effect was
more pronounced for the impersonal than the personal scen-
arios. For the 10 impersonal moral scenarios, the psycho-
paths endorsed a significantly greater proportion of the
proposed actions (M¼ 0.76, s.d.¼ 0.24) than did the non-
psychopaths (M¼ 0.59, s.d.¼ 0.18) (t¼ 2.9, P¼ 0.006). For
the 14 personal moral scenarios, the psychopaths endorsed a
slightly (but not significantly) greater proportion of the pro-
posed actions (M¼ 0.54, s.d.¼ 0.19) than did the non-
psychopaths (M¼ 0.46, s.d.¼ 0.15) (t¼ 1.6, P¼ 0.12).
We next address the main hypothesis of this study!that
low-anxious psychopaths, but not high-anxious psycho-
paths, would endorse a significantly greater proportion of
the personal moral actions than would the non-psychopaths.
The results confirm this prediction (Figures 2 and 3). The
low-anxious psychopaths endorsed a significantly greater
proportion of the personal moral actions (M¼ 0.58,
s.d.¼ 0.16) than did the non-psychopaths (M¼ 0.46,
s.d.¼ 0.15) (t¼ 2.3, P¼ 0.03), whereas the high-anxious
psychopaths (M¼ 0.49, s.d.¼ 0.21) did not significantly dif-
fer from non-psychopaths in their personal moral judgment
(t¼ 0.5, P¼ 0.60). This pattern of results held for the subset
of 10 ‘high-conflict’ personal moral dilemmas (Koenigs
et al., 2007; Greene et al., 2008), in which the ‘utilitarian’
choice (Greene et al., 2004, 2008) is essentially to kill one
person in order to save a number of others. On this subset of
‘high-conflict’ scenarios, the low-anxious psychopaths
endorsed a significantly greater proportion of the utilitarian
Table 1 Participant group characteristics
Age Est IQ PCL-R total WAS PCL-R F1 PCL-R F2
Low-anxious psychopaths (n¼ 12) 35.0 (6.2) 97.1 (12.4) 32.1 (1.5) 5.7 (3.7) 12.6 (2.1) 16.5 (1.3)
High-anxious psychopaths (n¼ 12) 31.8 (6.3) 98.2 (11.2) 31.2 (1.7) 21.2 (6.8) 11.3 (1.4) 17.1 (1.5)
Non-psychopaths (n¼ 24) 33.6 (6.4) 104.2 (11.2) 14.2 (4.1) 12.7 (8.2) 4.7 (2.4) 7.7 (3.0)
Est IQ, estimated IQ based on the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Zachary, 1986). WAS, Welsh Anxiety Scale; F1, Factor 1; F2, Factor 2. For each group, means are presented with
standard deviations in parentheses. The three participant groups did not significantly differ with respect to age (F¼ 0.76, P¼ 0.48) or estimated IQ (F¼ 0.99, P¼ 0.38). The
non-psychopaths had significantly lower PCL-R scores than both the low-anxious psychopaths (t¼"14.5, P< 0.001) and high-anxious psychopaths (t¼"13.7, P< 0.001).
Low-anxious and high-anxious psychopaths did not significantly differ in terms of PCL-R total score (t¼ 1.3, P¼ 0.20), PCL-R Factor 1 score (t¼ 1.8, P¼ 0.08), or PCL-R Factor
2 score (t¼ 1.0, P¼ 0.32). The low-anxious psychopaths had significantly lower anxiety scores than the non-psychopaths (t¼"2.8, P¼ 0.008) and high-anxious psychopaths
(t¼"7.0, P< 0.001). The high-anxious psychopaths had significantly higher anxiety scores than the non-psychopaths (t¼ 3.1, P¼ 0.004).
Fig. 1 Moral judgment data for psychopaths and non-psychopaths (with SE bars).
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actions (M¼ 0.74, s.d.¼ 0.19) than did the non-psychopaths
(M¼ 0.61, s.d.¼ 0.19) (t¼ 2.0, P¼ 0.05), whereas the
high-anxious psychopaths (M¼ 0.63, s.d.¼ 0.27) did not
significantly differ from non-psychopaths (t¼ 0.3, P¼ 0.75).
A different pattern of results was observed for impersonal
moral judgment (Figures 2 and 3). On these scenarios, both
the low-anxious psychopaths (M¼ 0.73, s.d.¼ 0.20) and the
high-anxious psychopaths (M¼ 0.79, s.d.¼ 0.21) endorsed a
significantly greater proportion of impersonal actions than
did the non-psychopaths (M¼ 0.59, s.d.¼ 0.18) (t¼ 2.2,
P¼ 0.03 and t¼ 2.7, P¼ 0.01, respectively). Taken together,
this combination of results indicates distinct patterns of
moral judgment for the low- and high-anxious subtypes of
psychopathy. Whereas both psychopathic subgroups endo-
rsed significantly higher proportions of impersonal actions,
only the low-anxious psychopathic subgroup also endorsed
significantly higher proportions of personal actions.
This result raises the question of whether the observed
group differences in personal moral judgment may be due
to strict group differences in anxiety, rather than due to
distinct subtypes of psychopathy. In other words, lower
levels of anxiety may be associated with greater endorsement
of personal moral actions, regardless of the degree of psych-
opathy. To examine this possibility, we divided the group of
non-psychopaths (those participants with PCL-R of 20 or
less) into high-anxious and low-anxious subgroups based
on a median split of WAS scores, exactly as we did for the
psychopathic sample. With these criteria, we obtained n¼ 14
low-anxious non-psychopaths and n¼ 10 high-anxious non-
psychopaths. As expected, WAS scores in the high-anxious
non-psychopaths were significantly greater than in the low-
anxious non-psychopaths (t¼ 6.3, P< 0.001), while PCL-R
total scores were similar (t¼ 0.6, P¼ 0.58). Importantly, the
difference in mean anxiety scores between the high-anxious
and low-anxious non-psychopaths (20.3 vs 7.2) was similar
to the difference in mean anxiety scores between the high-
and low-anxious psychopaths (21.2 vs 5.7).
For the personal moral scenarios, the low-anxious and
high-anxious non-psychopathic subgroups performed nearly
identically (M¼ 0.46, s.d.¼ 0.13 and M¼ 0.46, SD¼ 0.18,
respectively) (t¼ 0.1, P¼ 0.94). Moreover, the low-anxious
psychopaths endorsed a significantly greater proportion of
personal moral actions than did the low-anxious non-
psychopaths (t¼ 2.2, P¼ 0.04). These data indicate that
low anxiety, in and of itself, is not a strong determinant of
responses on the personal moral scenarios. Instead, it ap-
pears that exceptionally utilitarian personal moral judgment
is a relatively specific characteristic of the low-anxious
psychopaths.
Next, we provide follow-up analyses to address several
additional questions raised by the main study results. One
apparent limitation of the results reported in the main ana-
lysis is that although the low-anxious psychopaths did sig-
nificantly differ from non-psychopaths on the high-conflict
personal scenarios (whereas the high-anxious psychopaths
did not), low- and high-anxious psychopaths did not signifi-
cantly differ from each other. Clearly, a significant difference
between these two subgroups in a direct statistical compari-
son would bolster the claim that subtyping based on anxiety
is indeed an important consideration regarding the moral
judgment capacity of psychopaths. Here, we consider this
issue in greater detail. The statistical test we used in the initial
analysis was parametric (t-test), which is not the most power-
ful way to compare two groups with relatively small sample
sizes (n¼ 12 for both psychopathic subgroups). If instead we
conduct a non-parametric !2-test to compare the frequency
Fig. 2 Moral judgment data for low-anxious psychopaths, high-anxious psychopaths
and non-psychopaths (with SE bars). Asterisks indicate significantly greater means
than the non-psychopaths.
Fig. 3 Moral judgment data for individual scenarios. Proportions of ‘yes’ judgments
given by the subject groups for each of the impersonal and personal moral scenarios.
(A) Individual impersonal scenarios (numbered 1–10 on the x-axis) are ordered on
the basis of increasing proportion of ‘yes’ judgments by the non-psychopaths and
(B) individual personal scenarios (numbered 1–14 on the x-axis) are ordered on the
basis of increasing proportion of ‘yes’ judgments by the non-psychopaths. Among the
three groups of inmates, the low-anxious psychopaths made the highest proportion
of utilitarian judgments on nearly all of the personal moral scenarios.
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of utilitarian responses between the two psychopathic sub-
groups, we obtain a result that approaches significance
(!2¼ 3.3, P¼ 0.07).
Moreover, we observe that across the entire group of psy-
chopaths, anxiety score has a moderate negative correlation
with utilitarian judgments (r¼"0.40, P¼ 0.06) (Figure 4).
No such relationship is observed in the non-psychopaths
(r¼"0.08, P¼ 0.71). In our initial analysis, we defined the
low- and high-anxious psychopathic subgroups based on a
median split of anxiety score. Thus, given the observed mod-
erate negative linear correlation between anxiety score and
utilitarian judgment among psychopaths, group differences
could be muddled by the subset of psychopaths with anxiety
scores near the median (on either side). In other words, a
median split may not afford sufficient separation of sub-
groups based on anxiety score. To explore this possibility,
we subdivided the psychopaths into thirds, rather than
halves, based on anxiety score (Figure 4). The lowest third
(n¼ 8) had anxiety scores between 1 and 7 (M¼ 3.4); the
middle third (n¼ 8) had anxiety scores between 10 and
16 (M¼ 12.5); and the highest third (n¼ 8) had anxiety
scores between 19 and 36 (M¼ 24.4). A !2-test comparing
the frequency of utilitarian responses between the lowest
third and highest third indicates a statistically significant
difference (!2¼ 6.6, P¼ 0.01), with the lowest third making
a significantly greater proportion of utilitarian responses
(0.79 to 0.60). As expected, the middle third made an inter-
mediate proportion of utilitarian responses (0.68), which did
not significantly differ from either the lowest third (!2¼ 2.6,
P¼ 0.11) or the highest third (!2¼ 1.0, P¼ 0.32). This pat-
tern was clearly not present among non-psychopaths; the
lowest, middle and the highest third of non-psychopaths’
anxiety scores made nearly identical proportions of utilitar-
ian moral judgments (0.60, 0.63 and 0.60, respectively).
These follow-up analyses provide further support for the
inference of abnormally utilitarian moral judgment among
low-anxious psychopaths.
In addition to these predicted results regarding personal
moral judgment, we found the somewhat unexpected result
that psychopaths overall endorsed a significantly greater pro-
portion of impersonal moral actions than did non-
psychopaths!a pattern that was shared by both low- and
high-anxious subgroups. Cima et al. previously found no
significant differences between psychopaths and non-
psychopaths on judgments for impersonal moral scenarios
(Cima et al., 2010). The lack of significant differences in the
Cima et al. study could be due to a combination of two
factors: (i) smaller sample size (n¼ 14 psychopaths in the
Cima et al. study vs n¼ 24 psychopaths in our study) and
(ii) more lenient criteria for classifying subjects as ‘psycho-
paths’ (PCL-R score #26 in the Cima et al. study vs PCL-R
score #30 in our study). Indeed, when we analyze subjects in
our sample with PCL-R scores of 26–29 (n¼ 10, none of
whom were included in the previous analyses), we find
that their mean proportion of endorsement for the imper-
sonal actions (0.59) was identical to that of non-psychopaths
(0.59), and well below that of either subtype of psychopath
(0.73 and 0.79 for low- and high-anxious psychopaths, re-
spectively). Thus the null finding in the Cima et al. study is
very likely due to their lenient criteria for identifying psy-
chopaths. Similarly, a recent study of a community sample
found no significant correlation between psychopathy score
and responses to these moral scenarios (Glenn et al., 2009).
Again, we suspect that this null finding is due to the fact that
the majority of subjects in that study were not actually psy-
chopaths, as per the recommended PCL-R cutoff score for
psychopathy (Hare, 2003).
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated moral judgment in distinct psy-
chopathic subtypes. In particular, we tested the hypothesis
that low-anxious (primary) psychopaths, but not high-
anxious (secondary) psychopaths, would exhibit abnormally
utilitarian personal moral judgment. The data support this
prediction. Low-anxious, but not high-anxious, psychopaths
endorsed a significantly greater proportion of the personal
moral actions than did non-psychopaths. Importantly, this
effect held for the subset of high-conflict personal scenarios,
as well as in a comparison with the subset of non-
psychopaths with similarly low levels of anxiety.
Although our results challenge previous reports of normal
moral judgment in psychopathy (Glenn et al., 2009; Cima
et al., 2010), given the rigor with which we characterized
subjects in this study, we view our results as the most de-
finitive to date regarding the moral judgment capacities of
psychopaths. The present results suggest that, as a whole, psy-
chopaths are generally more willing than non-psychopaths
to endorse impersonal harms or rule violations in order to
achieve certain beneficial outcomes. We suppose that this
reflects the general proclivity toward antisocial behavior
Fig. 4 Scatterplot showing utilitarian moral judgment (y-axis; proportion of ‘yes’
responses to high-conflict personal moral dilemmas) as a function of anxiety score
(WAS) for the entire group of psychopaths (n¼ 24). Overall there was a moderate
negative correlation (r¼"0.40). The horizontal line segments on the plot indicate
subjects belonging to each third (n¼ 8) of the total sample, based on anxiety score.
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that is shared by psychopaths, regardless of anxiety level.
However, only the low-anxious psychopaths are more willing
to endorse the personal (and ostensibly more emotionally
averse) harms as a means to achieving their ends, which
may reflect a particular social/emotional deficit that is not
necessarily shared between psychopathic subtypes.
Our predicted finding of abnormally utilitarian personal
moral judgment among low-anxious psychopaths warrants
further discussion. As mentioned in the introduction, neuro-
logical patients with focal lesions involving vmPFC also ex-
hibit a pattern of abnormally utilitarian personal moral
judgment on this task (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs
et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010) (although it is important
to note that vmPFC lesion patients do not also exhibit
heightened endorsement of impersonal actions, nor do
they exhibit anywhere near the same degree of antisocial
behavior in their daily lives). Nonetheless, this pattern of
personal moral judgment findings (i.e. similar decision-
making profiles between vmPFC lesion patients and low-
anxious psychopaths) mirrors a recent study of economic
decision-making (Koenigs et al., 2010). In that study, we
found that low-anxious, but not high-anxious, psychopaths
performed similar to vmPFC lesion patients on the Ultimatum
and Dictator Games. Since both the personal moral di-
lemmas and the Ultimatum/Dictator Games are presumed
to index the degree to which social/affective vs cognitive/ra-
tional considerations influence decision-making (Greene
et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; van’t Wout et al., 2006; Koenigs
and Tranel, 2007; Moretto et al., 2010), the remarkably con-
vergent findings between vmPFC lesion patients and low-
anxious psychopaths could tentatively be interpreted as evi-
dence for a similarly disrupted integration of cognitive and
affective factors underlying decision-making. Interestingly,
the opposite pattern of behavior (decreased Ultimatum Game
rejections and decreased utilitarian personal harm endorse-
ment during moral judgment) has recently been observed in
neurologically healthy adults following the pharmaco-
logical enhancement of serotonin transmission in the brain
(Crockett et al., 2010). Taken together, these results provide
intriguing clues about the neuroanatomical and neurochem-
ical systems that mediate prosocial behavior, and hence, the
neural substrates that may be defective in psychopathy.
In sum, the results presented here are broadly consistent
with the theoretical perspective that low-anxious (primary)
psychopathy may entail a particular affective/inhibitory def-
icit that is not necessarily present in high-anxious (second-
ary) psychopathy (Karpman, 1946; Karpman, 1948; Cleckley,
1976; Lykken, 1995; Porter, 1996; Skeem et al., 2007;
Blackburn et al., 2008). An aim of future research will be
to specify the exact nature of the decision-making impair-
ments!and the accompanying neurobiological dysfunc-
tion!which plague these individuals.
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